SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT THE PLAYERS

My (Kevin Spraggett’s) Report On the Portuguese Team for the European Team Championships

(Note to reader: I was captain and team coordinator)

This was the first time that I have acted as captain for the Portuguese Team.

Before continuing, I must make clear that it was an honour and a privilege for me to captain the Portuguese players. Each of them behaved like perfect gentlemen, both at the board and away from it. I had heard numerous horror stories about past teams : sincerely, they must have been somewhat exaggerated! I would willingly jump at the opportunity to captain them any time in the future, without the slightest hesitation.

The Portuguese Team started classified as the 26th highest rated team (out of 35 teams), and ended in a tie for 26th and 27th positions. In reality, in the last round Portugal was fighting to avoid last place (or close to it!), but a 4 to 0 result against a helpless Wales enabled our team not only to avoid humiliation but also to ‘correct’ some previous ‘sins’...

How should this final result in Leon be looked upon?

First, let me say that most of my report deals with this question (and related questions) in a very detailed manner. Next, according to what Mr. Elo would have expected, the Portuguese Team’s result was a disappointment. On the Excel spreadsheet included in this report these results can be found with more detail. However, according to the table of statistics that I present later in this report (based on results against non-Portuguese international players over the past 4 years), the team actually performed a little better than I would have anticipated.

The European Team Championship is much stronger than the Olympics, principally because there are so few weak teams. Further complicating matters, the rules limit each team to not more than 5 players (including the reserve player) and therefore the captain finds that there is very little flexibility. There is no adequate solution for the team in fielding 4 players if more than one player is indisposed to play on any given day.

The strategy that I decided to use for Leon was a very pragmatic one and which was used previously (successfully) by the Canadian Olympic Team in 2000 and 1998: since the final classification for these team championships really depends on the results achieved in the last two rounds ( as can be proven statistically) my idea was to play the 4 best performing players in rounds 8 and 9. The first 7 rounds , therefore, would serve as practice and warmup in anticipation of the final two rounds. (As well as opportunities for the others to achieve norms.)

Luis Galego has had a truly stellar year , having achieved his Grandmaster title as well as winning numerous international tournaments. I realized that he would be tired when he arrived in Leon, and so it was my idea to play him as little as possible in the first 7 rounds—allow him to rest and regain his energy—and then count on him in the last two rounds. Unfortunately, no fault of any one person, Portugal was paired with the bye in the 8th round and this took the steam out of my strategy!

In reality, however, no other strategy would have done better: Damaso and Pinheiro were playing awfully, inspite of trying very hard; and Fernandes was having difficulty making 50%.

I will not be able to captain the 2002 Portuguese Olympic Team due to commitments to the Canadian Olympic Team. However, I am willing to continue to work with the preparation of the Portuguese Olympic Team, as well as work with the FPX as a technical adviser on related matters.

What follows in this report are some observations and recommendations that the FPX should consider very carefully, especially if it wants to play an active role in the improvement in the overall results of the Portuguese Team. This work is based on some very serious reflection and research.

INTRODUCTION

The past decade has witnessed a dramatic increase in the strength of teams being fielded by other countries participating in the Chess Olympics and the European Team Championships. Not surprisingly, running parallel to this exciting development there has been an increased emphasis on both professional coaching and achieving higher standards.

While the FPX could not have failed to notice this trend, there are few indications, if any, that the FPX has felt it was necessary to implement any changes to the way it supports its men’s team to these prestigious international events. Instead, successive administrations of the FPX have looked upon Portuguese participation as little more than normal obligations of its year to year calendar of activities and events, providing rarely more than the minimum funds necessary to physically transport the team to the playing venues. It is evident that the FPX has not considered improvement by the Portuguese team to be a priority.

The FPX provides no pre-event preparation or training for the members of the men’s team.

Leon was the first time (!) that the FPX actually sought the services of an experienced professional to perform the captain’s duties.

The honorarium to each member of the team has been reduced (!) to 30 contos (I can only assume so as to be able to pay the captain.)

As a consequence of the FPX having quietly acquiesced to pursuing a policy of mere participation, the Portuguese team is--more frequently than in the past--finding itself near the bottom of the score table. The recently completed European Team Championship in Leon (Spain) was no exception: only with a desperate effort in the last round was Portugal able to avoid being dead last!

From discussions with you it is clear that the FPX would now like to start seeing some improvement in the results of the Portuguese team. This is an important change in attitude from the past, should be fully recognized as such, and supported within the Portuguese chess community.

To achieve improvement, however, and to sustain it, it is not enough to limit oneself to making symbolic gestures followed by public statements of dissatisfaction with the status quo. Much more is needed:

It is necessary to take the political steps required to change the status quo.

Then it will be necessary to take concrete actions, and in particular, to back up these actions with the financial resources of the FPX.

Changes in the status quo require the creation of new objectives (that are clear and well defined), and these in turn require a fundamental re-thinking of the priorities of the FPX. In particular, it is necessary to prioritize both the European Team Championships and the Olympics, and to establish Portuguese performance in them as being more important (at least from the point of view of financial commitment) than the other normal obligations of the FPX calender of events and activities.

The FPX should not be surprised that the transition from an outdated form of amateurism (mere participation) to a more respectable form of semi-professionalism (relative competitiveness) costs more money than what the FPX has been spending up to now. However, what choice does the FPX really have?

In the near future some Portuguese team is not going to be as lucky as it was in Leon -- unless the FPX allocates money needed for the training, preparation and implementation of a more professional team oriented environment during the actual championships.

At a time when the government is unfortunately cutting back on the amount of money given each year to the FPX, it is so easy (not to mention convenient) to do nothing and limit oneself to make excuses for not being able to put more money into this project. However, this is where the importance of having clear, well-defined priorities comes into play, and as such it should be possible to re-allocate financial resources from some of the other calender events of the FPX towards any new priority of the Portuguese Team.

From what I can see of the year to year calendar of the FPX, there is a lot of redundancy and unnecessary waste built into its activities and events:

There are many redundant ‘national’ championships (Taça, Super-Taça; Torneio de Mestres, Portuguese Championship; Rapid Team Championship, Rapid individual Championship; etc). Portugal is a small country with few chessplayers and has no need to create so many champions. Money can be saved by reducing the FPX’s financial commitment to this type of assembly line philosophy of chess promotion. The FPX should instead be concentrating on quality, not quantity.

The policy of always having Portuguese representation in the Sub 10, Sub 12, Sub 14, etc world championships, seemingly indifferent to the level of play of the respective representative, is also a waste of the limited financial resources available. The FPX should reconsider the motivations of previous administrations (entirely political in nature, if I understand correctly) for pursuing such a policy. The FPX can save money by setting realistic minimum standards for Portuguese representation to such junior events: this means funding only those players who show exceptional promise. (Sponsoring a mediocre junior player in these championships, from the Sub-10 thru to the Sub 18 levels, probably costs much more than sending the entire Olympic Team!)

I am certain that there are other areas within the normal year to year functioning of the FPX that can be examined carefully in the search for funds that can be re-allocated towards the Portuguese team’s requirements. However, without the political commitment behind this and some re-thinking of the priorities of the FPX, it is next to impossible to do anything concrete to try to improve the performance of the Portuguese team, given the dramatic increase in playing strength of the teams from other countries.

Now is the right time, approximately one year before the next Olympiad, for the FPX to sit down and re-evaluate what it has been trying to achieve these past ten years or so.

What concrete steps is the FPX willing to take to avoid the Portuguese team finishing last in some future championship?

Will this translate into more money for the Portuguese Team?

The previous administration of the FPX addressed the issue of the deteriorating results of its team being sent to the European Championship and the Olympics by pursuing some policies that were, if not counter-productive, then certainly ineffective and controversial:

rationalizing the relative failure of successive Portuguese teams as being caused by perceived unprofessional behaviour on the part of several of its key players, and in the process publicly humiliating and punishing Luis Galego and Rui Damaso

hiring the services of a professional trainer ( IM Boris Zlotnik) whose speciality is in teaching gifted children (!), and then not even providing him with sufficient opportunities to work with the team.

Any preparation or training program done prior to sending the team to the Olympics must be realistic and suited to the specific characteristics and limitations of the individual team members. And this should include considerations of restrictions on how much time each member will be able to devote to these preparations. After all, some have jobs and family obligations and for one or two of them merely finding the 3 weeks to participate in the Olympics will be very difficult to manage.

It is equally important to realize that many of those likely to play on the Olympic Team are already well into their thirties, with the others not far behind. These players have their own ways of doing things, most are not accustomed to working very hard on the game and therefore are not going to take a renewed interest in chess simply because the FPX says so.

As such, the FPX should not think that there exists some miracle training program that will add 100 Elo points to their rating after just a couple of training sessions. With mature chessmasters, already having a significant amount of international experience, a ‘general purpose’ type of training and preparation program aimed at gradually improving the team members’ basic chess knowledge and technique (tactical and/or strategic) is inappropriate. It is a waste of everyone’s time and especially the FPX’s money.

For all intents and purposes this means that the FPX should not pursue a ‘’Botvinnik’’ style training program or ‘’Russian School’’ style training program. The previous administration had IM Boris Zlotnik give a weekend seminar based on some of these techniques. While I am certain that for most attending it was probably the first time that they had been exposed to any formal chess teaching (and I know that everyone enjoyed it) I am equally certain that not one of the top Portuguese masters attending learned anything new!

The ‘’Russian School’’ training system and the ‘’Botvinnik’’ training system are both work intensive programs that often require years of collaboration with the trainer to be effective. This effectiveness is not in doubt, and has been proven over and over again throughout the years. However, the student is required to do much independent work at home, just as if he was taking a university course. Therefore any expectations of even short term gains are pure nonsense.

The type of training and preparation program that I recommend for those likely to participate on the next Portuguese team for the Olympics is one that has no illusions. Specifically, this program:

is one that accepts that the Portuguese players will not play any stronger in the middlegame than they are presently capable of

but is one that seeks to optimise their potential results by making them more competitive

I recommend a training and preparation program that has the unique objective of modernizing the Portuguese players’ opening systems to allow them to compete (in the opening) on even terms with the international players. To be successful in modern chess competition you have to create problems for your opponent starting immediately from the opening: therefore it is imperative to play critical lines in the opening.

The Portuguese masters have never really worked on their openings, preferring instead to rely on natural talent and intuition. Having taken a close look at the systems used by all of the top Portuguese players I have found:

a generally sheepish attitude to the importance of the opening (almost a denial that the opening exists)

a reluctance to enter theoretical debates

a virtual absence of main line opening systems

a stubborn self reliance on ‘home made’ systems and rarely played lines

The openings are by far the weakest part of the Portuguese masters.

I recommend two or three weekend seminars spread over a four-month period prior to the Olympics. Each seminar would be for two days (Saturday and Sunday), with about 6 to 8 hours of work each day.

The seminar should be taught by at least one active grandmaster who can specialize in the current state of opening theory. I am available for these seminars, but I also suggest that the FPX keep other options open.

The role of the captain of the men’s team

Up until Leon the role of the captain was largely misunderstood by the FPX. For as long as I can remember the captain’s position was little more than a political appointment that had no direct benefits for the players, and served to be one more example of what the Portuguese team was lacking compared to the teams from the other countries!

It is important to distinguish the captain from the head of the delegation, so as to avoid any misunderstanding. The head of the delegation is a political position. For instance, the president of the FPX would be an excellent person to serve that position: he is responsible for the Portuguese representation anyway. The captain, however, focuses only on the team’s performance and can be considered to be part of the team itself. His responsibility is to the team’s objectives.

The choice of captain can have a fundamental effect on the willingness of the players to perform up to their potential and to peacefully co-exist and co-operate as a unit. (Team cohesion is a much-researched topic in modern sports psychology.) In theory, two teams of equal strength will achieve differing results depending on their respective captain’s skills. Praxis confirms this.

The captain should:

respect all of the members of the team and be respected by each member of the team

be able to unite the team and provide a satisfying environment for the members of the team to be in (so that they want to eat together and relax together after the games)

be able to make fair decisions and co-ordinate efforts

be able to spot potential trouble, solve problems (often by consensus) and smooth differences between members of the team if they arise

be a strong, experienced master who knows not only what the players have to go through but also how to motivate them to be positive

be able to get the best out of each element of the team

be willing and able to help the players prepare for their games

I have experience as both playing captain and non-playing captain, and over the years I have come to the conclusion that it is best for the team to have a non-playing captain. Of course, often financial limitations give us no choice! However, at these prestigious international team tournaments the captain often has to put in 10 to 12 hours work per day, a large part of it having to deal with technical details (submitting team lists, collecting game bulletins, waiting for pairing lists, etc). It can be very tiring, especially after the first week.

I have given more than a little consideration to which Portuguese player would be the most effective captain at the upcoming Olympics. Of course it is not possible to be completely objective in such a process, but I have come up with the name of Fernando Silva at the top of my list.

He has most of the qualities listed above. In particular, his very good relationship with the other top Portuguese chess players is an outstanding asset. He would be able to unite the team. On top of this, he has ‘been there’ and has enormous experience in international chess. I recommend that the FPX do its best to convince Fernando Silva to accept the role of captain.

Compensation

Next comes the question of how the FPX is to best compensate those players who would have to spend close to three weeks representing Portugal at the Olympics. Purposefully not wanting to get into some hypocritical discussion about amateurism versus professionalism or about how poor the FPX is (despite getting between 35,000 to 40,000 contos each year—and the Olympics taking place only every two years), I would prefer to consider this issue from a practical point of view: financially rewarding players is not a new concept in the real world of sports.

Creating incentives for players so that they will put in that little extra push is all part of constructing a winning team. Sports science has a large volume of literature on this. How does one motivate players to give their best effort even when exhausted? What drives an athlete to go just a bit further than he does normally goes?

For the European Team Championship in Leon, the FPX decided to give the players 30 contos each (which doesn’t even cover pocket expenses) along with the promise of receiving another 50 contos each if the team did better than 50%. (The FPX was not risking much …50% was out of reach for the Portuguese team: the European Team Championship was too strong.)

Did the players seem impressed with this? No. Neither were they particularly motivated by such an incentive. Clearly, what the FPX offered the players was not only unrealistic and inadequate. Regrettably it was also more that this: it was insulting to them.

The best approach is to give a certain minimum guaranteed honorarium to each player regardless of the final outcome, and then to use financial incentives each time the Portuguese team wins a match. That is, for example, that the FPX give an honorarium of 100 contos per player, with an extra 50 contos to each player each time the team wins against a higher rated team, 40 contos each time the team wins against a roughly equal rated team, and 25 contos each time the team wins against a lower rated team.

This type of incentive system also enables the players to remain interested and eager even as the championship progresses. On top of this, studies have shown that even though the players may not be able to produce more points under difficult situations, they give up less often. They resist more. Clearly in a three week championship this has enormous advantages.

Numerous countries use variations of the incentive program described above. I believe France did so at the 2000 Olympics in Istanbul (or at least in the 1998 Elista Olympiad.) And so did Canada, which in 2000 not unsurprisingly achieved its best result of the past 20 years!

The FPX may be tempted to argue that such an incentive program can be costly. However, three things should be kept in mind:

Together with the training and preparation time, each member of the Olympic Team will have given about 4 weeks of their time to Portuguese chess.

In reality, the Portuguese Team regularly loses more matches than it wins, and so the FPX will not have to take out an insurance policy against unlimited losses.

Every two year period (the Olympics takes place only every two years) the FPX receives between 70,000 and 80,000 contos from the government.

Clearly the FPX will not go bankrupt!

If this incentive program had been been used in Leon then one finds that since Portugal won only three matches (one against a team more or less equal in strength (Italy), and two lower rated (Turkey and Wales) ) then each player would have been entitled 90 contos. Add this to the guaranteed honorarium of 100 contos and one comes up with a total of 190 contos each player.

Of course this is much more than the 30 contos the FPX actually paid to each player, or 150 contos for the whole team. But then, I am talking about a modern incentive program approved by sports science; not about some meagre offer that serves to do little other than insult the players’ dignity even before the championship begins.

Technical Support

I would also recommend that the FPX consider providing someone who would be able to assist the team’s opening preparation. It is asking a great deal of the captain that he also do the research into the opening repetoires of the Portuguese adversaries each day, and then help the Portuguese players prepare each individual game.

Ideally such a technical person need not be such a very strong player (he could be merely of master strength), but he would need to know how to handle chess data bases quickly and effectively and then be able to co-ordinate his activities with the members of the team. Essentially he must be able to explain to the players who would have to play on a given day just what kind of opponent they would have to meet.

In principle, the Portuguese Team would best be served by having a non-playing captain as well as a technical person.

SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT THE PLAYERS

It is not my intention in this report to ‘select’ the next Portuguese Olympic Team. Rather, I present my view of those top players most likely to be considered to play, based upon both my own personal experiences with them (as a chessplayer) and on their individual results achieved against international players.

First some general observations:

The method of picking the best team by a system of rigid rules or a combination of Elo and results ( achieved in national championships ) is flawed for fundamental reasons:

Some top players may be temporarily inactive for professional reasons and hence not be able to participate in those championships that are counted for qualification purposes.

Elos can drastically increase (or decrease) because of only one exceptionally good (or bad) result.

Team chemistry is a significant factor in determining the team’s performance; problems between team members or leadership problems with the captain can prevent the team from achieving its potential.

We would all like to have a fair and reasonably objective system with which to select the Portuguese Olympic Team, but ‘fair’ and ‘objective’ do not often produce the ‘best’ team. Humans are a complex species : the ‘best’ team is more often than not one that is hand picked.
The Elo System of present day does not work efficiently, and it is not uncommon to find significant rating differences between players of the same strength but coming from different countries. With Portuguese players, I find that their Elos based on results in international play do not often correspond with their Elos based on results achieved in Portugal’s national championships. It appears that playing internationally depresses the Portuguese Elos. The reason for this is probably that the average Elo rated Portuguese master is over rated, and this factor is revealed only when playing with players of international experience. Tournaments such as those organized on a regular basis by Luis Santos are producing Elo rated players with minimum elos of between 2100 and 2200, and these players are simply acting as an easy source of rating points to the best Portuguese players whenever they play in the national tournaments. When these top Portuguese players in turn later play with international players they actually lose a portion of these rating points gained. Only Antunes and Galego are possible exceptions to this.

As a way of example, in this year’s San Antonio tournament the Portuguese players (as a group, Galego, Fernandes, Fernando, Damaso, Dias) scored 24% against the foreign international players (as a group, Yakovich, Chandler, Ubilava, Campora and Spraggett). The average of the international group was 2536. The average of the Portuguese group was 2410. That is, a rating difference of 126 points. From a total of 25 games played between these two groups, the Portuguese won only once, drew ten times, and lost 14 times. The actual result achieved by the Portuguese group was lower than expected (by Elo) and indicated a real difference of 200 rating points between the two groups: the Portuguese players underperformed themselves by approximately 75 rating points!

A great deal of relevant information concerning a chess player’s real strength is revealed when we consider his results against a diverse cross section of international players (FMs, IMs, IGMs), typically what one is likely to encounter in an international team tournament . With the view towards building a construct that can be useful in comparing candidates for the Portuguese Olympic Team , I have done some research into how the top Portuguese players perform when playing non-Portuguese international players, from the past three to four years, and this is presented in the table below.

RESULTS AGAINST (NON-PORTUGUESE) INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS

	Fernandes	Damaso	Frois	Pinheiro	Rocha	Rocha	Dias	Dias	Fernando	Fernando
Years	‘98-2001	‘99-2001	‘98-2001	‘99-2001	‘97-2001	2000-2001	‘98-2001	2000-2001	‘98-2001	2000-2001

White	51games	31games	35games	17games	36games	15games	33games	15games	36games	24games
% win	31%	19.3%	20%	35%	30.5%	40%	15%	07%	22%	17%
% loss	37%	38.7%	34%	35%	33%	33%	48%	53%	47%	46%
% draw	31%	42%	46%	29%	36%	27%	36%	40%	30%	37.5%
% score	47%	40%	43%	50%	48.6%	53%	33%	27%	37.5%	35.4%
Win:loss	1:1.2	1:2	1:1.7	1:1	1:1.1	1.2:1	1:3.2	1:8	1:2.13	1:2.75

Black	47games	19games	42games	17games	39games	17games	27games	11games	40games	24games
% win	23%	15.8%	26%	06%	23%	12%	30%	27%	20%	21%
% loss	40%	52.6%	45%	76%	49%	76%	59%	64%	50%	50%
% draw	36%	31.6%	29%	17.6%	28%	12%	11%	09%	30%	29%
% score	41.5%	23.7%	40.5%	14.7%	37%	18%	35%	32%	35%	35.4%
Win:loss	1:1.74	1:3.33	1:1.72	1:13	1:2.11	1:6.5	1:2.0	1:2.3	1:2.5	1:2.4

Notes

% score is the total number of points obtained by the player expressed as a percentage of the total number possible. For example, if player A played two games and won one and lost one, his %score would be 50%, since he obtained 1 point from 2 that were possible.

Win:loss ratio shows for every game won by player A how many he would lose. For example, a win:loss ratio of 1:3 would mean that for every game won by Player A he would lose 3 games. The Win:loss ratio is important in that it gives a clear idea of what to expect in a must win situation, or when a draw is ruled out.

The players Rocha, Dias and Fernando have two time periods each compared. The idea is that since each is in his twenties it would be nice to see how they have been doing in the last two years compared with a longer period of time.

4. White and Black indicate the number of games included in each sample for calculation purposes

This table is based upon a very up-to-date database (my own) . It is entirely possible that I do not have every game played by one or two of these players , but I would think that I have pretty much everything available that has been published. While these statistics only include the games played by Portuguese players against non-Portuguese international players, they are not meant to be taken as a rigorous argument of any particular point of view. The sample of adversaries of each Portuguese player is not necessarily identical, but does include a similar distribution of FMs, IMs and IGMs, and therefore comes close to representing the random selection of players that one is likely to meet in international team championships. These statistics are of use in comparing the relative performance of each player in the past three or four years, and give insight into the characteristics of each player’s strengths from both the white and black side.

I have excluded Luis Galego and Carlos Santos from these statistics for reasons which will later be explained.

When I completed these calculations I was startled with what I found: none of the players listed can score even 50% on the average!

Fernandes, Damaso, Frois, Pinheiro, Rocha, Dias and Fernando have each been consistently losing more games than they have been winning, several of them by a significant multiple.

The more experienced players are even having trouble holding their own with white.

The younger players (Rocha, Dias and Fernando)—instead of showing signs of steady progress and improvement in recent years—are showing signs of stagnation or worse: their win:loss ratios have generally been getting worse in the past two years ; while Rocha’s ratio with white has improved slightly to 1.2 : 1, with black it has collapsed to 1 : 6.5; Dias’ ratio with white is a catastrophic 1 : 8, with black it has worsened slightly to 1 : 2.3; Fernando’s ratio with white has declined significantly to 1: 2.75 , with black it has remained almost unchanged (1:2.4).

During the past two years (2000-2001) Dias has been losing 53% of his games with white and 64% of his games with black; Fernando has been losing 46% of his games with white and 50% of his games with black; Rocha has been losing 33% of his games with white and 76% of his games with black.

These are not very pretty statistics, and they raise reasonable doubts about whether these players can make a real contribution to a team that seeks to achieve a respectable international performance. Though they are all very talented individuals, talent does not go as far today as hard work does, and it is only too evident that these Portuguese players have not been working as hard as they should (assuming that they even try to work).

It is very clear to me that the next Portuguese Olympic Team has to be built around Luis Galego and Carlos Santos, with the hope that they can carry the rest of the team. The strategy for picking the rest of the team has to be realistic and (considering these stats) should be focused on choosing players who will be the least burden to carry.

Then, assuming the ‘best’ team is chosen, the rest will depend on the training and preparation that the FPX provides to these players, upon the choice of captain, and on the incentive program used to motivate the players.

A curious question is why haven’t the miserable results of the top Portuguese masters against international players (with the exceptions of Antunes, Galego) been noticed before? To explain it by suggesting that no one has actually done any research on the players’ statistics before now can only provide a partial answer. Perhaps another part of the reason is that Portuguese chess lacks the infrastructure to allow information to be passed to its members: there is no national chess magazine in Portugal! The typical member of the Portuguese chess community probably doesn’t know how their top masters are actually doing. But I would think that the most reasonable explanation for not noticing how poorly the Portuguese have been performing internationally (with the obvious exceptions of Antunes and Galego) is that people don’t really care. This brings us back to the point that the FPX has been pursuing a philosophy of mere participation, and the chess community has come to expect little more than that.

LUIS GALEGO (1966-04-25)

I have not presented any statistics of Galego for two reasons:

As Portugal’s most active international player, Luis plays everywhere. As such , I have not been able to find all of his results and games from recently completed tournaments in Angola, Brasil and Spain. Without them the statistics would be very inaccurate.

Having achieved his final norms for the Grandmaster title in the past six months it is clear that Galego’s play has recently taken a giant step forward. Any statistics from the past six months would necessarily be different from the previous three or four years.

Luis is undoubtedly the strongest player that Portugal has ever produced. He is, in my opinion, already a strong grandmaster even though his Elo says otherwise. (I am certain that his true stats would show that he scores more than 60% against international players.) The results from the past six months show that his talent is still developing. Much progress can still be expected in the next few years, given the proper opportunities and training.

Galego has to be considered a mandatory member of the next Olympic Team, and the ideal person for the first board. He has natural leadership skills and should, in the near future, be considered a likely choice for team captain.

CARLOS SANTOS ( 1972-06-20 )

Again, no statistics have been presented for Santos. His university course, recently completed, prevented him from playing a sufficient number of games against international players to be statistically useful.

However, it is clear that Carlos is one of the very best Portuguese players. His results from the 1990 Novi Sad Olympiad (where he narrowly missed a gm norm) prove his enormous talent. In 2000 he also achieved some of the best results registered by any of the Portuguese masters.

He is presently dedicating a significant amount of time to the study of chess, and is one of the few Portuguese masters capable of achieving GM norms in the foreseeable future. He must be considered a mandatory inclusion of the next Olympic Team, regardless of Elo.

ANTONIO FERNANDES (1962-10-18)

Fernandes must also be considered a mandatory inclusion on the next Olympic Team.

He has enormous international experience (25 years), has proven himself capable of winning against the best and is also one of the most active (and successful) Portuguese masters (despite having a full time job and family). His health is the best of any of the Portuguese masters, he has vast reserves of energy and a remarkable sense of competitivity. Furthermore, he is still a relatively young man.

All the more surprising then that Fernandes has been scoring less than 50% in recent years against international players. This is a cause for concern. Certainly the explanation of this has to do with his lack of study of chess, combined with an addiction to time trouble. (In Leon he often found himself (on purpose, I suppose) with literally seconds on his clock for as many as a dozen or so moves.)

His opening repetoire is third rate by international standards. When considered together with his time trouble problems, Fernandes can accurately be described an ‘’accident waiting to happen’’. Without any doubt Fernandes will be one of those who is most likely to profit from a training and preparation course on the openings. However, his other problem has no cure.

I would think that as Antonio approaches 45 years of age , and has much less energy to spare, his results will take a drastic turn for the worse.

In Leon, Fernandes scored 50%, a little bit better than what his statistics would have predicted and just about what his Elo predicted.

RUI DAMASO (1968-04-24)

Damaso should not be considered an automatic madatory inclusion on any Portuguese Team.

Rui is a tremendously talented chess player, perhaps even the most talented of any of the other Portuguese masters. And he is also one of the few who actually works on his game at home. However, his statistics are terrible: over the past three years he has scored just 40% with the white pieces and less than 25% with the black pieces. His win:loss ratios are, respectively, 1:2.0 and 1:3.33. ( He loses two games for every game he wins with the white pieces, and slightly more than 3 for every game he wins with the black pieces.)

Curiously, Rui’s results in Leon are almost exactly what his statistics might have predicted.

To be fair, however, it must be mentioned that before Leon he did superbly at the European Club Championship (these results are included in his statistics) and that he even finished first in some rapid chess tournament in Spain (I do not include this result in his statistics).

Though Damaso is capable of sparks of brilliance, even if only rarely, no chess player can play up to his potential if he is ill. (Damaso has a very serious illness) He has trouble remaining concentrated at the board for more than just a few minutes at a time, as can be seen from the fact that his average game length (with either colour) against international players has been less than 30 moves. (Had he been winning then that would be wonderful. But since he has been losing badly...)

From conversations with you in Leon I remember raising the possibility of excluding Rui from the Olympic team (for the team’s benefit) if he doesn’t seek some sort of treatment for his disease in the interim. However, after having taken a look at the statistics of the other likely candidates for the Portuguese Team (clearly excluding the three mandatory inclusions, Galego, Fernandes, Santos) , I have come to different conclusion:

Since Damaso’s results are generally better than the other candidates (Rocha, Frois, Fernando, Pinheiro and Dias) in spite of his health problem ,he should be seriously considered for inclusion on the team, but only as second reserve. Second Reserve can not play above 4th board. In such a way Damaso would probably be able to improve his statistics (and the team’s results) since he will likely be somewhat higher rated than most of his opponents (assuming that the Portuguese Team plays mostly against teams in the second half of the score table).

I should also mention that Rui is well liked and respected by all of the top Portuguese players, and that he contributes in no small way to the overall team spirit. Perhaps sometime in the future he might be considered as a possible captain of the team.

ANTONIO FROIS (1962-03-15)

Frois should not be a mandatory inclusion on the next Olympic Team.

Frois is one of the more solid Portuguese masters, has vast international experience, a semi-reasonable opening repetoire and achieved the best result on the team in Leon. He has some confidence problems when playing, curiously the exact opposite of Fernandes, and tends to get nervous as the game develops.

During the past 4 years (1998-2001) Antonio has been scoring in the low 40%’s with either colour. It should be noted that this is better than either Dias or Fernando, and on average is even better than Rocha’s results.

With white he has only been winning 20% of the games, and with black actually a little better: 25%. Curiously, even though he wins more games with black, he also loses more games with black than with the white pieces! Probably the reason for this is that his white opponents force him to play more than his black opponents , who are probably more disposed to accepting some of Antonio’s draw offers (given when he gets nervous).

When you consider how the next Olympic Team is chosen you should bear in mind that Frois’ performance is usually pretty steady and that he can be counted on to perform up to his normal level of play.

JOSE PINHEIRO ( 1964-01-02)

Pinheiro should also not be considered a mandatory inclusion on the next Olympic Team.

The past year Jose has achieved some excellent results in Portugal, and for this reason was chosen by you to play on the team in Leon. Incidentally, Leon was Jose’s first time representing Portugal in an international team tournament.

In Leon Pinheiro was an excellent team player, always ready to play and in each game he tried as hard as he could. He performed much lower than what his Elo indicated, and also did slightly worse than what the statistics above would have predicted. I noticed that he suffered a great deal in his games, and this is probably because he is not very experienced internationally.

As can be seen from the statistics, Pinheiro has one of the very best scores against international players with the white pieces (50%) and also one of the very worse scores with the black pieces (about 15%). With black Jose is a disaster. His win loss ratio with black is 1 to 13 ! (He loses 13 times for every one game he wins) It is virtually impossible to have a successful team with players who play exceptionally well with one colour and then are completely useless with the other colour. In team championships which colour one plays is often just a matter of randomness, and can not be controlled.

However, that being said, I think that Pinheiro’s principal problem is that he does not study enough (if at all), and that what he has studied is mostly useful for the white side. If he is to be considered for the next Olympic Team then he should be made aware that he has to work very hard on his black opening repertoire before then. There is no doubt in my mind that he would benefit enormously from a training and preparation program focused on improving his opening repetoire.

SERGIO ROCHA (1972-05-21)

Sergio is also not a mandatory inclusion on the Portuguese Team.

Rocha has always done better with the white pieces, and as the statistics show above, in the past two years he has actually improved his white results somewhat. He is, in fact, the only Portuguese player (apart from Antunes and Galego) to have a positive win:loss ratio with white ( He wins 1.2 games for every game he loses) !

However, there was a price for this: his win: loss ratio with black has drastically fallen to 1: 6.5 (He loses 6.5 games for every one game he wins)

Clearly, Sergio has not been studying chess very seriously these past two years. On top of this, from the numbers in the table it is clear that Rocha almost never travels abroad to get experience, and most of the international experience he has was with team championships.

If Rocha is to be considered for the next Olympic Team then it has to be made clear to him that he must start getting serious with his chess. He has to start showing some initiative. He is a very gifted player and at his age (and with his experience) there is no good reason why Galego and Santos should have to carry him.

PAUL DIAS ( 1979-05-01)

Dias’ statistics leave me speechless. Paulo should only be considered for the Olympic Team if the other candidates are kidnapped by aliens! Seriously.

I had selected him for playing on the Team for Leon (he declined), but I did this before having studied his statistics, which are really disappointing. I realize now that my choice was an error of judgement, undoubtedly influenced by some blind faith that the previous FPX administration had shown in him (sending him to the ‘98 zonal, etc).

Similarly, I question any rational critieria that would have allowed him to be selected to play on last year’s Olympic Team or have allowed him to have been invited to the international tournament in San Antonio ahead of players such as Rocha and Frois.

His stats say it all loud and clear: Dias plays very little serious chess...no studying...no initiative to play abroad in individual tournaments...loses most of his games (in the last two years). I see nothing in his stats other than disinterest for chess .

The FPX has to ask itself: ‘’How can any gifted young player, who has had the opportunities to participate in a zonal, the Olympic Team and San Antonio, have failed to develop as a player?’’ (His Elo presently is less than 2300)

It is a waste of time and resources for the FPX to invest in him.

To be fair, he is studying in University (mathematics). And his results against only Portuguese players are excellent. Considering that he is in his last year at University, it is fair to assume that he will have even less to give to chess in the interval between now and the next Olympics.

DIOGO FERNANDO (1980-12-09)

Fernando, while not being a mandatory inclusion for the Olympic Team, should be considered for selection before any of the other non-mandatory candidates (Frois, Pinheiro, Dias, Damaso, Rocha).

I believe the FPX should invest in its young players if they show interest and promise. (I had chosen him for Leon, but he declined, for understandable reasons.)

Fernando shows interest in improving. Even though he is also studying in university he travels abroad. He studies chess regularly (though he badly needs a professional trainer). Not included in the game sample used to base the above statistics is Cappelle LaGrande from earlier this year (the games are unavailable), where he played excellently at the beginning and collapsed only towards the end.

Also not included is the just recently concluded Loures tournament which he won. (However, his three draws with the international players (in 42 moves, 11 moves and 9 moves respectively) have little statistical value.)

While he has been losing too many games in recent years, his stats do show that he is beginning to learn to draw more than in past.

Fernando is a tough competitor and is not easily discouraged by having to defend inferior positions for hours on end. He could improve his results if he were to change his opening repertoire, and I am certain that he will gain much from the FPX’s training and preparation program before the Olympics.

CONCLUSION

This report can be considered in two ways: 1. As a blueprint for the FPX to start to build better national teams, or, 2. As an unwelcome intrusion into the sacred territory of the FPX.

In any case, this report is the best that I have to offer to the FPX as way of advice. The rest is up to you.

December 2001

Kevin Spraggett

Grandmaster